This paper studies the intraday spillovers of the 2010 U.S. Flash Crash to international equity markets. We document a substantial and almost immediate echo of the crash in Latin America. Using data for 148 firms trading in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico, we estimate price declines of up to 10% within minutes after the U.S. crash. Estimates for two different factor models indicate that this echo followed from normal interdependence rather than financial contagion. There is no evidence of contagion for firms with strong links to the U.S. economy.
Introduction
The exceptionally high volatility that U.S. financial markets experienced on the afternoon of 6 May 2010 still resonates today. On that Thursday, shortly after 14:30, prices on U.S. markets unexpectedly took a sharp downward turn.
1 Within minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) had lost more than 6% of its value. Market activity increased drastically, with over 20,000 trades taking place, sometimes at prices more than 60% away from pre-crash levels. Fortunately, after a brief trading halt markets quickly recovered, so that by 15:00 most securities were again trading around pre-crash levels (CFTC-SEC, 2010).
The idea that markets could suddenly move that erratically, and for no apparent reason, did not sit well with market participants, financial regulators, and academics. This particular episode of extreme market volatility -in short: the Flash Crash -has, therefore, been the subject of intense scrutiny. The importance of understanding the Flash Crash and its reper- Taking the U.S. events of May 6 as a starting point, this paper studies the intraday spillovers of the Flash Crash to international financial markets. To do so, this paper uses minute-by-minute data for 148 firms trading on four major Latin American stock exchanges, that is on exchanges in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Latin America is a natural choice for studying international echo effects of the crash, as markets in other continents were closed at the time. Furthermore, this sample of four countries covers a large share of trading in Latin America, in particular as Brazilian markets have by far the largest traded volumes (OECD, 2013) . Taken together, the countries used in this paper have a weight of more than 90% in the Dow Jones Latin America Total Stock Market Index. It is also the set of countries that often features in related work on shock transmission, such as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , Edwards, Biscarri, and Pérez de Garcia (2003) , or Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) .
This paper adds to the literature in two ways. Firstly, this paper contributes to the debate on the Flash Crash by documenting that its imme-4 diate ramifications were even larger than commonly discussed. Naturally, most empirical work on the crash centers on the U.S. experience. For instance, Madhavan (2011) shows that the propagation of the crash in the U.S. financial system was related to market fragmentation, as its impact was largest for stocks experiencing fragmentation before 6 May. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2017) find that the trading pattern of the most active nondesignated intermediaries did not change as prices fell. Even when faced with large liquidity imbalances, these so-called high-frequency traders did not change inventory dynamics. Menkveld and Yueshen (2017) argue that the crash was not simply the price of demanding immediate liquidity. Rather, a breakdown of cross-market arbitrage between the E-Mini market and the broader U.S. financial system meant that only local buyers could fill the large sell order initiated at 14:32.
Overall then, there is not yet much evidence for the reactions of non-U.S.
markets to the crash. Menkveld and Yueshen (2017) note that the crash echoed internationally by pointing to evidence for Canada. For that particular country, a government report found that the decline in equity markets during the crash equalled more than 3% (IIROC, 2010) . By analysing developments for a range of Latin American firms, our paper offers a further detailed perspective on the international spillovers of flash crash events.
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Secondly, by exploiting the exogenous nature of the crash from the perspective of Latin America, this paper contributes to the literature on financial contagion. In particular, our paper is related to previous work studying the international fall-out of the U.S. crash of October 1987. As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have argued, it is important in this context to distinguish between normal comovement between financial markets (i.e. interdependence)
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and an increase in cross-market linkages (i.e. contagion). In earlier work on the 1987 crash, Bennett and Kelleher (1988) had described how equity prices in many countries dropped even more than in the U.S., though they argued that the interactions during the crash were similar to previous volatility spillovers. King and Wadhwani (1990) modelled the contagion after the 1987 market crash as coming from agents inferring information from price changes in other markets. Using hourly data for markets in New York, London, and Tokyo, they found that contagion coefficients increased during the crash. Bertero and Mayer (1990) found similar results, while also concluding that trading halts and capital controls may have moderated the speed of declines in some non-U.S. markets. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) then argued that tests for contagion based on changes in correlation coefficients should have corrected for differences in volatility. When revisiting the evidence on the 1987 crash while correcting for heteroskedasticity, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) no longer found evidence of a significant increase in correlations. They concluded that the market comovement after October 1987 was due to interdependence rather than contagion.
To distinguish between contagion and interdependence during the 2010 flash crash, we follow Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014) in estimating factor models to interpret international comovements between stock returns. We estimate two such factor models. A first model uses index returns as dependent variables and a U.S. pricing factor. A second model uses returns for individual stocks and adds a global as well as a domestic pricing factor. These factor models allow us to measure normal comovements (i.e. three-month T-bill proxies the risk-free rate. The data source is Bloomberg, which ensures a full coverage, as trading data is transmitted directly from the stock exchanges to Bloomberg terminals.
To distinguish whether any spillovers of the U.S. crash should be interpreted as financial contagion or interdependence, this paper follows Bekaert et al. (2014) in estimating factor models. In a first model approach, we regress Latin American index returns on a U.S. pricing factor as follows 4 : For a second model approach, we estimate a three-factor pricing model.
Here, we use stock returns for all 148 individual constituents in our data set and build on the following specification from Bekaert et al (2014) :
where R i,t now denotes the excess return (in percentage terms) for stock i in a given minute t, and F t is a vector with excess returns for U.S., global, and domestic pricing factors, so that
We estimate the factor models using a sample that runs from 3 May 2010 up to and including 6 May 2010. In doing so, we use around 3.5 days of minute-by-minute observations to estimate regular levels of comovement.
Given the relatively short length of this sample period, the factor models do not include dividend yields as explanatory factors. All returns are in local currency. 6 For the three-factor model, we follow Bekaert et al. (2014) in excluding the return of the individual stock from the domestic pricing factor, in order to avoid picking up a spurious correlation. Also, we follow their approach of orthogonalizing the global factor by regressing MSCI returns on DJIA returns and then using the residuals from this regression as the global factor. We orthogonalize the domestic factor by regressing domestic index returns on the MSCI return and the DJIA return and then using the residual from this regression (see also Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang, 2009 ).
The estimated β coefficients of the factor models can be used to determine the degree of pre-crash equity market comovement. These β coefficients In the final step of the analysis, we consider whether particular firm-level variables explain the cross-sectional variation in the shock transmission. In particular, we determine whether firms that have stronger linkages to the U.S. economy were differently affected during the Flash Crash. We follow Bekaert et al. (2014) in including each firm characteristic (denoted by Z) individually in the following regression model:
For this specific question, the important parameters in equations (4) - (7) are those in β 1 and γ 1 . The three parameters in β 1 measure whether an individual Z variable has an effect on the normal comovements with US, global, and domestic pricing factors. The three parameters in γ 1 measure how the Z variables contribute to changes in comovements during the crash episode.
Significant and positive estimates for parameters in γ 1 would be evidence for contagion during the Flash Crash related to specific firm characteristics. In addition to these four variables, we use a broad set of firm characteristics (Table 1, (2004), we use common equity, earnings per share (EPS), market capitalisation, net income, net sales, return on equity (ROE), and total assets.
panel B). As in Forbes
7 Varying this particular threshold of 5% does not materially impact the conclusions.
Further results available upon request.
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[insert Table 1 around here] 3 Spillovers of the Crash to Latin America Taking the index decline between 14:32 and 14:45 as a metric, the spillovers of the Flash Crash were largest for the Brazilian equity market. From peak to trough, the decline in the BOVESPA was more than 4%. After 14:45, the Brazilian stock market also tracked the recovery of the Dow Jones quite closely. For Argentina as well as Mexico, the decline of the index was around 2%. However, markets in Argentina took longer to recover, as the MERVAL remained below the pre-crash level for the remainder of the trading session.
In contrast, the Mexican IPC index had already returned to pre-crash levels around 15:15. Finally, Figure 1 indicates that the equity market of Chile was only marginally affected, with a decline in the IPSA index of less than 1%.
[insert Figure 1 around here]
Turning to data for index constituents, we find that the cumulative declines in firms' stock prices were sometimes substantial. The top line in Table   2 denotes, for each of the four countries, the largest peak-to-trough decline between 14:32 and 14:59. We observe the largest decline in Brazil, where one stock price declined by a maximum of 9.6%. In Mexico, the largest decline was 6.9%, while in Argentina and Chile the maximum declines were, respectively, 5.5% and 2.6%. These peak-to-trough changes were perhaps not as large as in the United States, where the largest decline in this time frame for a DJIA constituent was 13.9%, but the declines were still sizeable.
[insert Table 2 around here]
The other entries in Table 2 further illustrate how the Flash Crash echoed in Latin America. Table 2 summarizes averages per minute across constituents for stock returns, squared returns (as a proxy for market volatility), bid-ask spreads, the number of trades, and traded volumes. For each of these measures, we present averages for each of the three sub-periods after the crash started. The averages are the coefficients of the three dummies in the vector F C, which we include in fixed-effects panel regressions that also control for time-of-day effects. Column 5 presents, again for comparison, averages across the 25 DJIA constituents.
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In general, and in line with the evidence in Figure 1 , we conclude that the market in Brazil was most strongly affected. On average, stock returns declined by 0.16% per minute during the immediate crash episode between 14:32 and 14:44, while volatility was up by 0.13%, and bid-ask spreads increased by 0.05%. In addition, there was a significant increase in both the number of trades (by 0.72%) and traded volumes (by 0.96%) for the 55 BOVESPA constituents ( 
Estimates for Factor Models
Given the evidence for an echo of the Flash Crash in Latin America, we now turn to the interpretation using the factor models. Table 3 reports results for five regressions that use index returns as dependent variables and the U.S. market return as pricing factor. We use these regressions, which are specified as in Equation (1), to see if the comovement with the U.S. market changed during and after the crash. The first line presents the normal comovement with U.S. returns, while the remaining lines give changes in comovements during the crash, recovery, and aftermath periods. Column 1 of Table 3 presents a panel regression that pools the four indices in our 14 data set; Columns 2 -5 present results for time-series regressions per country.
[insert Table 3 around here]
The key insight given by Table 3 Turning to the estimates for index constituents, Table 4 presents estimated coefficients for the three-factor model outlined in equations (2) [insert Table 4 around here]
9 The indications of interdependence in Table 3 are broadly in line with Lahrech and Sylwester (2011) . Based on a dynamic conditional correlations model, they find that Argentina and Chile showed the least comovement, while Mexican equities had the greatest comovement with the U.S. One should note that the sample period in their paper ends in 2004, making a direct comparison not possible.
Firstly, we find the expected evidence of interdependence between U.S. markets and Latin American markets. The estimated β coefficient for the U.S. factor is equal to 0.30 (Table 4, In contrast to the analysis of index returns, the analysis of individual stock returns gives some indications of an increase in comovement during the last hour of trading on 6 May. Whereas the estimations using index returns indicate a decoupling from the U.S. market during this phase (Table 3) , the analysis of individual stock returns indicates a small increase in comovement (Table 4) . One way to explain these differences between the factor models may lie in the fact that index returns presents weighted averages of individual returns. To study this further, we estimated the three-factor model per 16 quartiles of index weights.
10 Table 5 present the loadings for the U.S. pricing factor per index weight quartile. The increase in comovement during the last hour of trading was located in the bottom quartile, i.e. those 37 firms with the smallest index weights across all 148 stocks in the sample (Table 5 , column 1). The analysis based on quartiles also shows that the decoupling during the recovery phase was concentrated in the bottom three quartiles. In addition, Table 5 makes clear that during the crash phase, there was a small increase in comovement with the U.S. for the bottom three quartiles, though the estimated parameter is only significantly different from zero for the third quartile. The γ coefficients for the largest 37 firms point to a general degree of decoupling, though they are no significantly different from zero (column 4).
[insert Table 5 around here]
Role of Firm Characteristics
We now consider whether firm characteristics are relevant for the transmission of the Flash Crash to Latin America. Firstly, we analyse whether there was heterogeneity across industries. Table 6 reports normal comovements and changes in comovement during the Flash Crash, where we categorize the 148 individual index constituents using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 11 There are three interesting findings, though there is no consistent pattern in the sense that one particular industry is always most strongly 10 We construct these quartiles by pooling all data and categorizing all 148 firms in four groups, as this brings us closest to the analysis in Table 4 . We obtain qualitatively similar results when constructing weight quartiles per country. 11 We exclude the technology industry, as only two Latin American firms in the sample fall into this category.
affected. Firstly, during the crash episode, there is an increase in the consumer goods industry, though the increase is only significant at the 10% level.
Still, the normal comovement of 0.22 is almost doubled for this category of firms (Table 6 , columns 1 and 2). Second, the decoupling from U.S. markets during the recovery phase was located in three specific industries: oil and gas, consumer services, and telecommunications. This conclusion follows from the significant and negative estimates for γ 0 of, respectively, -0.34, -0.43, and -0.22 (column 3). In particular for the latter two industries, stock returns virtually decoupled from U.S. events. Lastly, the increase in comovement during the aftermath period was located in three industries: industrials, consumer goods and financials. The increase was particularly large for the financial firms, as the normal comovement of 0.20 almost doubled to 0.39 (column 4).
[insert Table 6 around here]
Turning to a further analysis, Tables 7 and 8 report regression results for the extended three-factor model that includes, one Z variable at the time, measures for firm characteristics (equations (4) - (7)). Table 7 reports results for measures of linkages with the U.S. economy, while Table 8 focuses on a broader set of firm characteristics. The two tables report estimates for measures of interdependence (β 1 ) and contagion (γ 1 ). The γ parameters are again reported for three sub-periods. The tables show comovements with the U.S. factor, the global factor, and the domestic pricing factor. The key issue is whether there is any evidence of contagion during the crash episode, i.e.
positive estimates for γ parameters related to the U.S. pricing factor.
Starting with measures for linkages to the U.S. economy, we again find no evidence for contagion during or after the crash on 6 May. Those γ estimates in Table 7 that are significantly different from zero are negative rather than positive, suggesting once again a degree of decoupling from events in US markets. Interestingly, most of this decoupling took place in the aftermath of the crash, which follows from the negative γ a 1 for firms with more than 5% assets in USD, and firms that report financial results in USD. Regarding interdependence, firms that cross-list have 0.12 higher regular comovement with the U.S. pricing factor. Firms that reports in U.S. dollars also have a 0.18 points higher β 1 coefficient, but this difference is not significant at the 10% level. Whether or not a certain percentage of assets or liabilities is held in U.S. dollars does not seems to be a very relevant factor for normal comovements, which is somewhat surprising. However, it has to be said that these two variables are not very precisely measured, as there is no uniform way of presenting this information in the company reports.
[insert Table 7 around here]
For the broader set of firm characteristics, there is again little evidence for contagion. Most γ estimates related to the U.S. market factor in Table 8 are not significantly different from zero. The only two pieces of evidence suggesting contagion concern return on equity (γ c 1 = 0.01) and the log of common equity (γ r 1 = 0.06). This first estimate indicates that a one percentage point increase in ROE meant a stronger comovement with the U.S. factor during the Flash Crash by 0.01 percentage point. The second estimate indicates that a one percentage point increase in common equity meant a stronger comovement with the U.S. factor during the Flash Crash by 0.06 percentage points. In both cases, the economic significance seems small. Moreover, these two γ estimates are only significant from zero at the 10% level. Concerning interdependence, we find that the regular comovement with the U.S.
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factor increases with firm size. This conclusion follows from the positive β coefficients for common equity, market capitalisation, net income, and total assets. Overall, the analysis of firm characteristics confirms our earlier finding that contagion was virtually absent during and after the Flash Crash.
[insert Table 8 around here]
Conclusions
This paper finds that a flash event in U.S. financial markets can quickly and strongly affect the international financial system. As U.S. financial markets crashed shortly after 14:32 on 6 May 2010, stock returns in three out of the four major Latin American countries studied in this paper also quickly became negative. In addition, market volatility increased, bid-ask spreads widened, and trading activity increased. The effects of the U.S. crash were most visible in Brazil, where the BOVESPA index dropped by more than 4%, while stock prices of individual firms declined by up to 10%.
A natural question is to what extent this echo was a direct reaction coming from normal interlinkages in the international financial system, or, alternatively, a degree of contagion. Estimates from two different factor models give, overall, no indications that comovements between Latin American markets and the U.S. increased during the immediate crash episode. If anything, Latin American equity markets decoupled from U.S. events. It is not until the hour after the crash that there are some indications of increased comovement, but only to a small extent. Overall then, this paper finds that the spillovers of the 2010 Flash Crash occurred through interdependence rather than contagion, a conclusion that is in line with the reinterpretation of the 1987 crash by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . (15:00 -15:59) period. These averages are coefficients for three dummies in fixed-effects regressions that also control for time-of-day effects. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.
(1) 
where R i,t denote index returns per minute on the MERVAL (Argentina), BOVESPA (Brazil), IPSA (Chile), and IPC (Mexico) between 3 and 6 May 2010. As explanatory variables, the model uses a U.S. pricing factor and includes interaction terms between this factor and three dummies that track the chronology of the Flash Crash on 6 May . Column 1 is based on a pooled regression, while the other four columns report time-series regressions per country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significant differences at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
(1) by firm. *,**,*** denote significant differences at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
(1) This table reports comovements of individual firms' stock returns with the U.S. pricing factor, based on the three-factor model described in Table 4 .
We classify the firms using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
We exclude the technology industry, as only two firms fall into this category.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *,**,*** denote significant differences at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) R i,t = α i,0 + α 1 R i,t−1 + β F t + η 0 F C t + i,t (11)
See panel A of 
